UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-3-2015

Plaster v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41780

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Plaster v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41780" (2015). Not Reported. 1796.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1796

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID
JONATHON GEORGE PLASTER, JR., )
)
Petitioner-Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)

OPY

No. 41780
Cassia Co. Case No.
CV-2013-799

)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent

_____________

)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CASSIA

HONORABLE MICHAEL R. CRABTREE
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho

JONATHON GEORGE PLASTER, JR.
IDOC #81349
PO Box 14 - Unit 16
Boise, ID 83707

PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
RESPONDENT

PROSE
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings .......................... 1
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................3
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................4
Plaster Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary
Dismissal Of His Untimely Successive Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief .......................................................................... .4
A.

lntroduction .................................................................................4

B.

Standard Of Review .................................................................. .4

C.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Plaster's
Successive Petition As Untimely ................................................ 5

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

CASES

Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,174 P.3d 870 (2007) ......................... 5, 6, 8
Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001) ..................................... 5
Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 836 P.2d 1088 (Ct. App. 1992) ....................... 4
Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999) ..................... 7
Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 219 P .3d 1204 (Ct. App. 2009) .......................... 5
Murphyv. State, 156 Idaho 389,327 P.3d 365 (2014) ......................................... 7
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247,220 P.3d 1066 (2009) .................................... 5
Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 88 P.3d 776 (Ct. App. 2003) ............................... 5
Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 177 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2008) ................... .4, 5

STATUTE
I.C. § 19-4902 ....................................................................................................... 5

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jonathan George Plaster, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered
following the district court's order summarily dismissing his successive postconviction petition.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In Cassia County Case No. CR-2008-249, Plaster was charged with, and
pied guilty to, seven counts of lewd conduct and one count of sexual abuse of a
child under sixteen years of age. (See R., p.96.) The court imposed concurrent
unified sentences of 40 years with 20 years fixed for the lewd conduct charges
and a concurrent 25-year sentence with 20 years fixed for the sexual abuse
charge. (See R., pp.96-97.) Plaster appealed and the Idaho Court of Appeals
affirmed.

(See R., p.97.) The Remittitur in Plaster's direct appeal issued on

October 4, 2010. (See R., p.97.)
On May 24, 2011, Plaster filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in
Cassia County Case No. CV-2011-525.

(See R., p.97.)

The district court

summarily dismissed Plaster's post-conviction petition and the Idaho Court of
Appeals affirmed "[i]n an unpublished opinion dated July 10, 2013." (See R.,
p.97.)
On September 5, 2013, Plaster filed a successive petition for post(R., pp.7-55.)

conviction relief, raising 26 claims.

Plaster explained his

successive petition was "filed due to the fact that [his] Amended Petition for Post
Conviction Relief was denied and there was no transcript provided/permitted."
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(R., p.7.)

Plaster did not request the appointment of counsel to assist him in

pursuing his successive petition. 1 (See generally R.; see also R., p.97 (court
noting Plaster "did not request the appointment of counsel to represent him").)
The state filed an answer (R., pp.74-77), and the district court issued a
notice of intent to dismiss ("Notice") (R., pp.96-101).

In its Notice, the court

advised Plaster it intended to dismiss his successive petition because the
petition was not timely filed. (R., p.98.) The court also notified Plaster that any
claims based on the proceedings in his initial post-conviction action were not
cognizable. (R., pp.100-101.) Plaster filed a response to the Court's Notice (R.,
pp.103-108), after which the district court entered an order dismissing Plaster's
successive petition (R., pp.109-113). Plaster filed a timely notice of appeal from
the judgment. (R., pp.115-120.)

1

Plaster did, however, request the appointment of counsel to assist him on
appeal. (R., pp.121-124.) The district court granted this request (R., p.132), but
appellate counsel was allowed to withdraw after Plaster asked to proceed prose
(Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel and Leave to Suspend the Briefing
Schedule, filed July 15, 2014; Order Granting Motion for Leave to Withdraw and
to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated August 8, 2014).

2

ISSUE
Plaster's brief does not contain a statement of issues on appeal as
required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4). The state phrases the issue as:
Has Plaster failed to establish that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his untimely successive petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
Plaster Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Untimely
Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Plaster filed his successive petition for post-conviction more than one year

after his conviction became final.

(R., p.7; see p.97.)

The district court

concluded that Plaster's successive petition should be dismissed because it was
untimely. (R., pp.96-101, 109-113.) On appeal, Plaster claims the district court
erred in dismissing his petition based on timeliness because, he asserts, he has
a "sufficient reason" for filing his untimely successive petition and that his
successive petition relates back to the date he filed is original petition.
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Plaster's claim fails because he has failed to articulate
any legitimate basis from which the district court could find his petition was timely
filed.

Plaster has therefore failed to show the district court erred in summarily

dismissing his untimely successive petition for post-conviction relief.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court freely reviews the district court's application of the statute of

limitation to a post-conviction petition. Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189,
177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 628,
836 P.2d 1088, 1089 (Ct. App. 1992)).
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C.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Plaster's Successive Petition As
Untimely
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be

commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later."

The

failure to file a timely post-conviction petition is a basis for dismissal. Schwartz,
145 Idaho at 189, 177 P.3d at 403 (citing Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957,959, 88
P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003)). In the case of successive petitions, the Idaho
Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid application of I.C. § 19-4902 would
preclude courts from considering 'claims which simply are not known to the
defendant within the time limit, yet raise important due process issues."'
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)). Absent a
showing by the petitioner that the limitation period should be tolled, the failure to
file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal of the
petition.

Rhoades, 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066; Evensiosky v. State, 136

Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001 ); Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 190, 219 P.3d
1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009).
Plaster did not file his successive post-conviction petition until September
5, 2013 (R., p.7), nearly three years after the October 4, 2010 Remittitur issued
in his direct appeal (see R., p.97). Plaster's successive petition was, therefore,
clearly untimely based on the one-year statute of limitation.

Plaster does not

dispute this conclusion, but claims he has a "sufficient reason" for filing a

5

successive petition under I.C. § 19-4908 and that his successive petition relates
back to the date of his original petition.

(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

Plaster's

arguments fail.
Plaster's reliance on the sufficient reason standard for filing a successive
petition under I.C. § 19-4908 is misplaced because it does not resolve the
question of whether Plaster's successive petition was timely filed. That Plaster
believes he has a sufficient reason that would allow him to file a successive
petition does not mean he timely filed his successive petition. While a petitioner
may have a legally sufficient reason for filing a successive petition, the petition
must still be timely. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904-905, 174 P.3d at 874-875.
The relevant inquiry in deciding if Plaster's successive petition was timely filed
requires consideration of whether Plaster filed his successive petition within a
reasonable time of when the claims raised in the petition were known or

kl

reasonably could have been known.

at 904, 174 P.3d at 874.

constitutes a reasonable time is analyzed on a "case-by-case basis."

What

kl

Plaster characterizes the claims in his successive petition as "nearly
mirror[ing] those" raised in the amended petition he filed in his first postconviction case.

(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

Thus, Plaster's successive petition

claims were known during his first post-conviction proceedings, which forecloses
any assertion that he is not bound by the one-year limitation period set forth in
I.C. § 19-4902(a). Plaster's reliance on the relation back doctrine is consistent
with this point, although Plaster is not entitled to relate the filing date of his
successive petition back to the date he attempted to amend his initial petition.
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In Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999), the
Court of Appeals applied the relation back theory to allow the petitioner to timely
file a successive petition to litigate claims that were inadequately raised in the
initial petition because post-conviction counsel was ineffective. The continuing
viability of Hernandez in terms of application of the relation back doctrine is,
however, questionable in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 391, 327 P.3d 365, 367 (2014), in which the
Court foreclosed the possibility that ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel can qualify as a sufficient reason "under I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a
successive petition."
Even if the relation back theory as applied in Hernandez is still viable, it
would not benefit Plaster in this case because the claims he raised in the
amended petition he filed in his first post-conviction action that he attempts to
reassert in his successive petition were not dismissed due to any alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel.

Instead, the claims were never considered

because Plaster was never given leave to amend his initial petition.

(See R.,

p.110; #40193 R. 2 , pp.142-143.) To the extent Plaster believes the district court
erred in not considering the claims he alleged in the amended petition he filed in
his first post-conviction case, he should have raised that claim on the appeal
from the court's summary dismissal order; he did not.

See Plaster v. State,

Docket No. 40193, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 576 (Idaho App. July 10,

2

Contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion to take judicial notice
of the Clerk's Record prepared in relation to Plaster's first post-conviction appeal,
Plaster v. State, Docket No. 40193.
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2013) (appeal from district court order summarily dismissing first post-conviction
petition, challenging district court's denial of discovery requests). The district
court's failure to consider the claims in Plaster's amended petition, filed in his
first post-conviction case, does not justify application of the relation back doctrine
with respect to his successive petition.
Applying the reasonable time standard to the timing of Plaster's
successive petition (as opposed to the relation back doctrine), as required by
Charboneau, Plaster did not file his successive petition within a reasonable time
of learning that the claims he alleges in his successive petition were not
considered in his original post-conviction case.

The district court summarily

dismissed Plaster's first post-conviction petition on June 7, 2012. (#40193 R.,
pp.141-151.)

Plaster did not file his successive petition until more than 14

months later. (R., p.7 (successive petition filed September 5, 2013).) Fourteen
months is not a reasonable time. Compare Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174
P.3d at 875 (holding that 13 months "is simply too long a period of time to be
reasonable").
Plaster has failed to establish he is entitled to application of the relation
back doctrine or that he filed his successive petition within a reasonable time.
Plaster has therefore failed to show the district court erred in dismissing his
successive petition as untimely.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's
summary dismissal of Plaster's untimely successive petition for post-conviction
relief.
DATED this 3rd day of February 2015.

Depu
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of February 2015 I caused two true and
correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
JONATHON GEORGE PLASTER, JR.
IDOC #81349
PO Box 14 - Unit 16
Boise, ID 83707
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